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The 16th century was a period of notable and far-reaching change within the Military 
Orders, which decisively marked their evolution over the following two centuries: between the reign 
of Manuel, at the same time sovereign and the administrator of the Order of Christ, and the period 
of Castilian Habsburg rule in Portugal, the face of these institutions was radically transformed. 
The aim of this paper is to survey this process of transformation and analyze the importance 
of each of the changes as well as their overall effect. A synthetic approach will be adopted and the 
paper presented in essay form. 
In view of the current state of research, this obviously involves a considerable degree of 
difficulty; firstly, because the research which has been carried out into each of these changes is 
incomplete and insufficient, due, among other reasons, to a lack of sources in Portuguese and 
                                                           
1 The following abbreviations are used in this essay: ANTT - Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais / 
Torre do Tombo; BN - Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. 
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Spanish archives, especially with regard to the Order of Christ (one can only hope that one day the 
study of the vast wealth of material held in the Secret Vatican Archive will shed new light on these 
issues); secondly, an analysis of how and why the Portuguese Military Orders changed in the 16th 
century cannot be carried out solely on the basis of knowledge about such institutions. 
Unfortunately, with the exception of topics associated with the Portuguese Discoveries and the 
resulting trade flows, little is known about Portugal itself (as opposed to the Empire) during the 
period before Alcácer-Quibir (1578) and a knowledge of domestic political structures and the 
impact that they had on society is essential for an understanding of the Military Orders. 
For these reasons, the scope of this paper is limited to three structural changes which took 
place during the 16th century: the transfer of the perpetual tutelage of the Masterships to the 
Crown; the introduction of individual service as the usual means for obtaining habits and 
commanderies; and the adoption of statutes dealing with purity of blood.  
 
1. Fro m the ad min istrators approved by the Pope to the perpetual  tutelage of the 
three Or ders  by the  C rown 
 
In 1418, when the Infante John (the son of John I) was appointed Master and Governor of 
the Order of Santiago by the Papal Bull, In Apostolice dignitatis, a new stage in the governance of the 
Military Orders was initiated. In the 15th century, the sons and direct descendants of the sovereign 
had served as administrators of the Orders of Santiago, Christ (the Infante Henry from 1420) and 
Avis (Dom Fernando from 1434). 
This policy had been largely established by John I, as early as 1417 when the Master of the 
Order of Christ, Lopo Dias de Sousa, died. The king suspended preparations for the following 
election (SILVA 1997: 76). From then on, Rome was presented with the Crown’s candidate, whom 
the Pope was expected to merely approve. 
However, Dom John (the future John II) was the first king to exercise direct control over 
the Masterships of Avis (1468-1490?) and Santiago (1472?-1490?). Historians, nevertheless, have 
little knowledge about this period. In 1482, due to pressure of affairs of the Crown (PIMENTA 
2002: 61), John II delegated the administration of the Order of Avis to three figures (Lopo Vasques 
de Azevedo, a steward; Dom Pedro da Silva, Commander of Seda; and Lopo da Cunha, 
Commander of Albufeira). Meanwhile, at the Évora-Viana do Alentejo Cortes of 1481-1482, the 
commoners’ delegation (braço do povo) indirectly voiced its concern about the importance of these 
two institutions remaining under the direct control of the sovereign (ALMEIDA 1967-1971: I, 
347-348). 
In turn, Manuel, Duke of Beja and the Administrator of the Order of Christ, kept his 
Mastership when he became king on the death of John II, and, from then on, the institution was 
never free of Crown control. Although John II made a will making provision for his bastard son 
Dom Jorge to inherit the Order, when Dom Manuel became king, he did not comply with John’s 
wishes: in Manuel’s will, he stated that the Masterships should remain in the hands of the 
sovereign, his sons or brothers, “as it is of great financial benefit and necessity to the Kingdom, for 
many reasons”. With regard to the Order of Christ, he was more exacting: “It will never leave the 
control of the Crown, or the King, for this would be most harmful, and most inconvenient, both for 
the Kingdom and for the King” (SOUSA 1946-1954: II-1, 416). 
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When Dom Jorge died on 22nd July 1550, the news of his death took almost a month to 
reach Rome. Instructions were sent with the news that a request should be made to Pope Julius III 
for approval of the transfer of control of the Military Orders to John III, who was already the 
administrator of the Order of Christ. It is highly likely that, following the Castilian example, the 
king had already planned this move before the death of the bastard son of John II. 
On 2nd September of that year, the Portuguese representative in Rome, Baltazar de Faria, 
sent John III an account of the success of negotiations with the papal authorities following the 
Portuguese request for the Orders to be placed under Crown control. In order to persuade the Pope 
to accede to the request, the following arguments had been employed: 1) “changes which were made 
in the past, both in Portugal and in Castile, as these Masterships had been beyond the control of the 
Crown”; 2) the fact that such a request had been made in the Cortes: “on a matter which is so 
important for the good governance of the kingdom and keeping the peace within it”; 3) John III had 
already gained control of the Order of Christ, for the same reasons; 4) the great expenditure borne 
by the Portuguese Crown “with continuing wars both in Africa and in India as well as other parts” 
(Corpo Diplomatico…1862-1959: VI, 413-414). In practice, the several points can be summed up 
in two main arguments: the pacification of the Kingdom and the maintenance of the Empire in the 
face of the threat from the infidel. Meanwhile, the pullout from the North African fortresses, which 
occurred in the 1540s, rendered this matter opportune. In the discussions involving Pope Julius 
III, Cardinal Crescencio and Baltazar de Faria, the subject of the withdrawal from Arzila, which had 
taken place shortly before, was broached. Baltazar de Faria defended the decision as a strategic option 
taken by the Portuguese Crown rather than a sign of weakness: “I shall seek to satisfy the Pope by 
informing him of the reasons why we have abandoned our fortress, it being more expedient to have 
other important places fortified at great cost, which can then be supplied all year round, unlike 
Arzila” (Corpo Diplomatico…1862-1959: VI, 414). 
The Pope inquired as to the income of the three Masterships, and as the Portuguese king 
had such a great commitment to spreading the faith, according to Baltazar de Faria, “the pontiff 
declared that he would not refuse him any favor I might request, and that he would freely grant such 
favors without asking for anything in return, such as ecclesiastical posts or revenues” (Corpo 
Diplomatico…1862-1959: VI, 414). 
Indeed, thanks to his record of colonial exploits in North Africa and in the East, John III 
was highly regarded by the Papacy, in what was an era of dissension and profound religious conflict 
in Europe and great tension between Henry II of France and Charles V of Spain and the Pope, who 
was therefore very favorably disposed towards Portugal. 
The final issue as far as negotiations were concerned was what form the document granting 
papal approval was to take; there were two possibilities: the issue of a brief or a bull. The latter 
solution would endow the process with much more dignity than the former, but it would incur 
considerable expense: “a bull must be issued with a lead seal and there is a requirement for mention 
of the income of the Masterships at the Chancellery, and a half anata must be paid; if a bull is 
issued by the Secretariat and not by Chancellery, there is a requirement for the payment of a 
composition” (Corpo Diplomatico…1862-1959: VI, 415). Both the “composition” (contract) and 
the “half anata” (half of the income received in the first year) would involve the payment of a large 
sum of money, due to the fact that the revenues of the Masterships were so great; some years before, 
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Charles V had paid 30,000 ducats, or about 12,000 contos (1 conto = 1,000 réis) for the issue of a 
similar papal bull.  
However, Baltazar de Faria managed to persuade the Pope to accede to the king’s entreaty 
without incurring any expenses, arguing that the money would be better spent on “the pressing 
financial needs of Africa and other very urgent financial needs” (Corpo Diplomatico…1862-1959: 
VI, 415), and, using the same argument, he set out to obtain the order granting this request. On 
26th August, the day Julius III granted the king’s request, Baltazar de Faria asked him to 
promulgate a bull but to waive the ‘composition’ payment. 
These two favors sought from the Pope led to a great deal of controversy at the papal court2. 
Many argued that an opportunity had been lost to serve the needs of clienteles of the curia by 
exacting from the Portuguese king the payment of sums deriving from churches and religious 
houses. Even the Emperor had not been exempted from payment in a similar case. However, the 
entreaty of John III was quickly acceded to, at zero cost to the Portuguese Crown. 
Having achieved great success in his negotiations with the Papacy, Baltazar de Faria ended 
his message to the king in Portugal by recommending that he should soon request that the Crown 
be allowed to assume perpetual control of the three Masterships. In his opinion, “there will be no 
difficulty, as they are already under Crown control, and as this is an extremely important matter, 
and the time is opportune; I would make a request (…) because a council may be held soon and 
other impediments may arise which stand in the way of strategy. Although it seems that the present 
position is satisfactory (…) bringing them perpetually under the tutelage of the Crown will render 
them more secure” (Corpo Diplomatico…1862-1959: VI, 416). It was feared that the reforms in 
progress in the Church would produce significant and unforeseen changes.  
We can deduce from a letter written by the Duke of Bragança that must date from the end of 
1550 (30th December) that Baltazar de Faria’s suggestion unsettled the king. In the duke’s 
opinion, “Your Highness is duty bound by the authority of your Realms to seek to assume control 
of the Masterships for the Crown and perpetually so. In this matter I have no doubt, as it seems that 
I have already heard in the presence of Your Highness something to this effect: if Your Highness 
had not already made such a request it was because it had little chance of being granted or because 
there was a fearful financial cost involved” (ANTT, Corpo Cronológico, Part I, Mç. 89, doc. 43).  
At this juncture, John III decided to offer a present of a ring, set with a diamond valued at 
100,000 cruzados, to the Pope for benefices received. The Duke of Bragança noted in the letter 
referred to above that the ambassadors should try to “make the request following the gift of the ring 
Your Highness has sent”; he thought that the circumstances were favorable and that consequently the 
affair should not be put off. Thus an effort should be made to try to reach an agreement without any 
cost being borne by Portugal: “In my view, this is so fitting for both parties that it seems to me that 
Your Highness and the Pope can say to each other that they have nothing of value to offer each other 
but both will give up what they possess. I say this because, for our sins, perchance His Holiness 
                                                           
2On 1st September 1550, Cardinal Gaddi congratulated John III and also stressed in his letter the 
fact that the favor had been granted without expecting anything in return – ANTT, Corpo 
Cronológico, Part II, Mç. 242, doc. 25. This was not, however, the only document in which such 
surprise was expressed. 
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will have more power to grant the transfer of the ownership of masterships than to cure the sick, as 
he has always done and said” (ANTT, Corpo Cronológico, Part I, Mç. 89, doc. 43). 
In mid-1551, John III followed Bragança’s advice, having previously advised the Nuncio 
in Lisbon (DE WITTE 1980-1986: I, 497-498) of his intentions. In John’s instructions to the 
Ambassador in Rome, he advised him to first give the Pope the ring and then, with Julius III well-
disposed as a result of receiving the present, to make a request regarding commanderies (this issue is 
dealt with supra, chap. 2) and finally the request regarding the granting of the tutelage of the Orders 
to the Portuguese Crown (Corpo Diplomatico…1862-1959: VII, 50-52). Once again, Julius III 
acceded without delay, and the news was sent to Portugal in September (Corpo Diplomatico…1862-
1959: VII, 58-60).  
As was common under such circumstances, from this moment on other battles were to 
begin. Firstly, there were those close to the Pope who sought to gain advantage from the importance 
of the concession and obtain a share of the benefits. Secondly, the Portuguese emissary acted with a 
view to ensure that the details of the document were worked out favorably for the Crown before the 
final version was dispatched. The Ambassador had promised John III that he would examine the 
document before it was signed by the Pope in order to ensure that nothing had been altered or 
omitted. As was often the case, a draft document was sent to the king to reassure him that 
arrangements were going according to plan (Corpo Diplomatico…1862-1959: VII, 80, 82, 86).  
One point on which there was some doubt, around the beginning of December 1551, was 
how the Masterships should be governed should they fall into the hands of a woman. Dom Afonso 
de Lencastre answered the Pope’s queries on this that “this would not be necessary to look into, that 
His Holiness should conduct the matter just as he had done with the Castilian bull” (Corpo 
Diplomatico…1862-1959: VII, 86). The bull of 1523 dealing with the transfer of control of the 
Castilian masterships was well-known in Portugal and at the papal court, and on several occasions 
was pointed to as an example during the drawing up of the Portuguese bull; Lencastre even wrote to 
the king to tell him he had had a clause omitted: “with Your Highness’s blessing I withdrew a point 
saying that the Portuguese Crown would pay the Holy See for rights, if payment was owed” (Corpo 
Diplomatico…1862-1959: VII, 86). In the event this question did not appear in the Portuguese 
bull.  
However, the text of the Portuguese bull does not consist of a mere collage of parts of the 
text contained in the bull issued to Charles V, but was written with the Portuguese context in 
mind3. While in the bull of 1523 the role of the Emperor had been extolled in the struggle against 
Protestantism and the Turks, here the Portuguese Crown was cited as waging war “on land and at 
sea” and spreading the faith “in different parts in the Indies, in Africa, Ethiopia and Brazil”. The 
transfer to the Crown of tutelage of the Masterships in perpetuum was designed to lend support to 
this effort. The victory in the two sieges of Diu (1538 and 1546) was verbosely referred to in the 
text in a tone of encomiastic proselytizing. 
In a provision also contained in the Castilian bull, the Master of the Orders was not allowed 
to sell off their patrimony. While the bull issued to Charles V stipulated that all matters pertaining 
                                                           
3A Castilian translation of the bull of union given to Charles V appears in POSTIGO 
CASTELLANOS 1988: 267-272. That of 1551 can be consulted in Portuguese in Definicoens e 
Estatutos… 1671: XXV-XLIII. 
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to the spiritual life of the Orders should be conducted by “religious persons of the said orders who 
must be appointed by the said kings”, the same safeguard was not included in the text of the bull 
issued in connection with the Portuguese Crown; John III and his successors were obliged to 
administer “spiritual and temporal matters in the manner described in our briefs, which were drawn 
up for the purpose.” 
The transfer was also couched in terms of a concession made by Julius III on his “own 
initiative and without a request being made by the same King, John III, nor petition from another, 
which might be presented by him, but out of mere liberality, and certa ciência.” As has been 
shown, this was not exactly the case. John III had requested the granting of the favor, although not 
in writing. The request was not granted in return for anything (except for the ring referred to 
above), although the Nuncio in Lisbon (DE WITTE 1980-1986: I, 498), when he was informed 
of it, expressed the view that there was a need for retribution; besides this, some sections of the 
Roman curia expected a posteriori to receive something in return, and this was still the case in 1553, 
although such expectations were in vain (DE WITTE 1980-1986: I, 339, II, 717-718, 738).  
Another peculiarity of the Portuguese bull is that it alludes not only to the inheriting of the 
Masterships by women acceding to the throne, but also minors, including girls: “even should a 
female accede to the throne of the same Kingdoms, or a minor of seven years, and though the said 
minor be a female, thus, the King, or by default the Queen, of the said Kingdoms who in times to 
come might be the perpetual administrator of each of the said Orders, and of their Masterships.” 
Thus, no risks were taken, allowance being made for all eventualities. 
It should be noted, meanwhile, that, as with the Castilian bull, only the office of Master or 
Administrator was transferred to the possession of the Crown and not the Military Orders 
themselves. Their existing privileges and practices continued in place, and sovereigns had to swear to 
honor them before being allowed to govern the institutions, according to the bull of 1551, although 
in that of 1523 there had been no such provision. With regard to these arrangements, Masters 
continued to be dependent on Rome and the autonomy of the Orders was maintained; thus they did 
not truly become Crown property. For these reasons, Portuguese kings, when addressing the 
Military Orders, had to sign orders as ‘governors and perpetual administrators’, otherwise they 
would not be obeyed. This duality of status of the king and master, and the subordinate rank of the 
latter, being dependent on Rome, was a state of affairs that later arrangements would reinforce. It 
constituted a means of limiting the control sovereigns had over these institutions. 
The move to transfer the tutelage of Orders to the Crown encountered opposition neither 
within the Military Orders themselves nor within the Upper Nobility. A degree of disaffection 
would have been expected from the Duke of Aveiro; however, there is no evidence demonstrating 
such a reaction on his part; following the transfer of the tutelage of the Masterships of Alcântara, 
Calatrava and Santiago to the Castilian Crown by Charles V (AYALA MARTÍNEZ 1997), one 
might have expected that a similar development was likely in Portugal.  
The advantage that the sovereign gained in 1551 was the power to control these institutions, 
which possessed considerable material and symbolic resources. In about 1607 to 1611, their 
revenues were roughly equivalent to about 9% of the gross income of the Kingdom and the Empire 
put together (FALCÃO 1859: 5, 210). Besides this, the transfer of tutelage took place at a time 
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when the Crown, having asserted its role as the chief beneficiary of the profits of the maritime 
Expansion, was shaken by its first periods of serious economic crisis4. 
The three Masterships possessed great resources. Masters approved by the Holy See had 
used the Military Orders to construct and satisfy their clienteles; from 1551, this capital passed into 
the hands of the Crown. The way in which they were brought under the sovereign’s control acted as 
an extremely important means for the disciplining of the aristocracy and furthering the process of 
the social construction of the early modern Portuguese state. Besides providing a source of finance 
for the process of colonial expansion, it contributed towards transforming Portugal into one of the 
most centralized states in Western Europe (OLIVAL 2001).  
 
2.  Fro m corporate serv ice to ind i v id ua l  serv ice in  exchange  fo r  reward  
 
From the mid-15th century onwards, there were insistent appeals by some, including the 
Holy See itself, for the return of the Military Orders to the battlefield. Following a request by 
Alphonse V in 1463, the Papacy sought to oblige Portuguese knights to defend North Africa: Pius 
II ordered monasteries attached to the Orders to be founded in Ceuta, where a third of all knights 
were to reside for a year in rotation. However, this order was revoked in 1467, at a time when the 
Orders of Christ and Santiago were governed by Dom Fernando, the king’s brother. In the sentence 
of the revocation, it was stressed that the knights of the Orders of Avis, Christ and Santiago were not 
bound to engage in combat abroad because these Orders had been established merely to defend the 
Iberian territory (ALMEIDA 1967: I, 348-349; BN, Cód. 13216: 48-48v).  
At the Cortes of Coimbra-Évora of 1472-1473, the third estate demonstrated an interest in 
the knights of the Orders serving in Africa (SOUSA 1990: 433). At the Cortes of 1481-1482, it 
insisted on funding for expenses incurred in “lugares dallem” (North Africa) being derived from the 
revenues of the Orders of Christ and Santiago, together with the Order of Christ, on the death of 
the Duke of Viseu; it proposed that commanderies should be awarded in exchange for services 
rendered in places abroad to be stipulated by the Crown. In one of the chapters of the Cortes, the 
example was given of the knights of Rhodes, who won their commanderies in combat (ALMEIDA 
1967-1971: I, 347-348). 
As soon as Manuel became king and Master of the Order of Christ, he made efforts to 
ensure that there was a return to warfare, which was in the Crown’s interest. At the General Chapter 
of the Order in 1503, he managed to establish a small number of commanderies for exclusive award 
to those performing four years’ service in North Africa. He argued in favor of such requirements on 
the basis of the principle that the Order of Christ had been established to serve Our Lord in combat 
against the Moors and the enemies of the Catholic faith (A regra e diffinições…, 1506?, chap. LI). 
Thus, an identitary topic is brought to the fore, on the basis of which the king sought to establish a 
                                                           
4At the beginning of 1552, when the bull of union reached Portugal, poverty was widespread. In 
July of the same year, the Nuncio gave an account of the great changes caused by the entry into the 
port of Lisbon by several Flemish vessels: "hanno dato la vita a tutti questi regni et in particolare a 
questo re, il quale sendo stato un anno senza un carolino d'entrata dal alfandega et senza vender nulla 
di speciarie (...) era una pietà a vedere et sentire li modi com li quali si procurravano danari per li 
vitto quasi quottidiano della casa, oltra li pianti de questi mercanti et bottegai di questa cità" (DE 
WITTE 1980-1986: II, 717-718). 
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pattern of behavior in keeping with former times by those holding the habit of Christ, which might 
later influence the action of others. An attempt was made to put into practice the above-mentioned 
suggestion of the Cortes. In the same General Chapter, mention was also made of the creation of 30 
commanderies in North Africa, each worth 10,000 reals, exclusively earmarked for “the residents of 
the fortresses of North Africa, who live in them and have their houses and wives there.” (A regra e 
diffinições…, 1506?, chap. LXIV). 
Thus began a process that was extended in 1514 with the establishment of the “new 
commanderies” of this Order. By means of the Bull Redemptor Noster Dominus Iesus Christus (As 
gavetas.., 1960-1977: II, 472-478) of 29th April, King Manuel provided for 20,000 cruzados to 
be levied from monasteries, priories and parish churches for the establishment of commanderies 
reserved for those fighting for the Crown in North Africa or in other parts of the globe, on land and 
at sea, as the papal document states. Following the grandiose embassy of obedience to Leo X, and 
throughout his term as pontiff, good relations between the Portuguese Crown and the papacy 
enabled the king to obtain great favors, including this one (SALVATORE DE CUTIIS, 1899: 62-
74). On 19th January 1516, the Pope authorized the creation of more new commanderies deriving 
from the revenues of 50 churches from royal patronage, and a deadline of one year was set for their 
establishment (As gavetas.., 1960-1977: II, 422-432). 
Such papal concessions were part of a process of the allocation of resources deriving from the 
clergy for the financing of the war in Africa (SILVA 2002: 115-116, 286) that caused a degree of 
disquiet among ecclesiastics and made the creation of such rewards more difficult. The process of the 
establishment of new commanderies in Portugal was difficult: it was only achieved after a 
considerable time and after several rounds of negotiations, both in Portugal and in Rome, with those 
who considered their interests to have been harmed.  
Meanwhile, six months after the promulgation of the bull of 29th April 1514, Manuel set 
out in a royal letter the conditions and criteria on the basis of which he would grant new 
commanderies: “although to some degree it might seem that the words of the bull are more open to 
interpretation.” (ANTT, Gavetas, VII, Mç.14, doc. 13). The aim was to interpret the papal 
document in the best interests of the Crown. Basically, it was established that new commanderies 
would be awarded to those who served for two years in Africa, as long as they had been issued with a 
royal letter of authorization indicating the place in which service was to be performed. The costs of 
rendering service were to borne by each individual but there was no requirement that one should 
have previously been awarded a habit in order to be able to request from the king the document 
authorizing “going and serving for a commandery in North Africa”, as this kind of behavior was 
later described. Thus, an effort was made to encourage as many as possible to apply for rewards. It 
was now patently possible to obtain a habit or a new commandery of the Order of Christ, the king’s 
blessing having been received, merely by performing military service. There was now no 
requirement either for religious formalities to be observed before embarking on such a course of 
action. The Order of Christ was set to become the prize for taking part in a series of battles with the 
Moors in the Maghreb, under the king’s orders.  
The royal letter of 29th October 1514 also set out a series of advantages for residents at the 
Royal Court (moradores da Casa Real), in order to impel such individuals to go to war: firstly, they 
would continue to receive dwellings (moradias) and barley, as they did at Court; and secondly, as 
soon as they started to render service they could receive the said commanderies, without having to 
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have previously fulfilled the requirement for two years’ service (meanwhile, those who were deemed 
to have qualified under such circumstances would have to continue to render service in order to 
complete the specified period, and they could not leave beforehand). 
Those who finished the two-year period without receiving a commandery would have to 
present the sovereign with a certificate signed by the captain (capitão), bookkeeper (contador) and 
military chief (adail) of the place in which service had been rendered, stating the period of service, 
the number of horses and the number of auxiliary staff whom the individual in question had 
engaged at his own cost, as well as the relevant deeds performed, wounds suffered, periods of 
captivity experienced, and the loss of horses or other possessions that had been suffered during the 
rendering of service. The reason for these details was that: “with more reason and justice, they 
should be provided with the said commanderies sooner and also possibly with improved terms and 
increased income.” At the end of the royal letter, it was stressed that “the power to grant the said 
commanderies will always be reserved for us, the king, and the kings who follow us, in accordance 
with the worthiness of each one”.  
Thus, both before and after 1551, the sovereign made a continuous effort to steer the 
Military Orders back to war – not an easy task. 
As early as 1550, when the Crown managed to gain control of the three Military Orders, it 
immediately sought to reinforce the logic of exchange implied in the rule of service and the granting 
of commanderies. Towards the end of the letter of 2nd September 1550 in which he gave an account 
of the successful granting to John III of control of the Masterships of Avis and Santiago for life, 
Baltazar de Faria mentioned an episode which served to shed light on the subtle type of resistance 
that might be encountered. Carrying out orders he had received from Lisbon, he visited the 
different issuing offices of the Holy See in order to make sure that orders in connection with rewards 
which might go against the interests of the new administrator would not be issued in the future. He 
discovered a request, which had already been approved, in connection with the commandery of 
Mora of the Order of Avis, whose revenues were assessed at 1,500 cruzados, regarding the following: 
Luís de Mendonça had requested the approval of the renunciation of the commandery with respect 
to a six-year-old son of his, with the consent, prior to his death, of Dom Jorge, who had given his 
permission for the transfer of the commandery during the father’s lifetime. Baltazar de Faria 
managed to block the process by citing the minority of the renounced child (who should have been 
aged 15 according to the statutes of the era in order to become a member of the Order) stating that 
“it would be such a harmful thing to make this exception, thereby ignoring the safeguard that the 
award of commanderies should only be made in return for services rendered; this would destroy the 
Orders.“ (Corpo Diplomatico…1862-1959: VI, 417-418).  
In the letter of 1551 containing instructions to the ambassador, Dom Afonso de Lencastre, 
regarding the request to be made to the Pope with a view to achieving the transfer of the tutelage of 
the three Masterships to the Crown, John III delegated another task to him: it concerned 
commanderies, a matter which he considered “a question of my conscience, which neither can nor 
should be clear if His Holiness does not accede to my request on this matter.” (Corpo 
Diplomatico…1862-1959: VII, 50). The ambassador was instructed to present the question of the 
commanderies to the Pope before broaching the issue of the transfer in perpetuum of the Masterships 
to Crown possession. Two papal briefs were granted on 7th October of that year: in Exponi nobis, 
Julius III made provision for the king-master to oblige commanders of any of the three Orders to 
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fight the Moors, in person and accompanied by a certain number of horses and foot-soldiers 
dependent on the revenue of the commandery; if they did not go to war, they had to pay for it. In 
the other brief, it was stated that wherever the revenues of new commanderies of the Order of Christ 
were not sufficient for commanders to go to war, they should be exempted from requirements 
involving the presentation of documentary proof, and their revenues should be used by the king for 
financing the war (Corpo Diplomatico…1862-1959: VII, 67-71).  
In fact, in 1551, John III sought not only to transfer the Orders to the perpetual tutelage of 
the Crown but also to introduce the rendering of service in exchange for the granting of 
commanderies. However, in practice, he only rapidly achieved the latter aim with regard to the new 
commanderies of the Order of Christ. Despite the efforts of successive kings, only in the reign of 
Sebastian did the king manage to impose a similar obligation on those seeking commanderies of the 
Orders of Santiago and Avis, in addition to candidates for the “old commanderies” of the Order of 
Christ. 
In the 1560s and 1570s, King Sebastian personified the values of the Christian knight, 
brought up to believe in the ideals of the crusades; and, indeed, he regarded the struggle in North 
Africa as a crusade. 
Apparently, one of the reasons why the General Chapter of the Order of Christ was called 
in 1573 was the need to build a monastery for the Order at Cape St Vincent in the Algarve, “in 
which the Order of Christ should be based, in order to defend the whole of the Algarve against the 
Moors and the Turks, who every year pillage and enslave Christians” (SERRÃO 1960: 228). Such 
an undertaking would make it possible for commanderies to be obtained, such as those of the Order 
of Malta, by rendering service as a combat soldier of the Order. However, it did not produce any 
practical results. 
Meanwhile, in connection with the concessions that Sebastian sought from Rome 
throughout his reign, he did not always request that all the knights of the Military Orders should be 
required to take part in combat, as though they all belonged to a unitary body. 
In fact, it was during this era that the idea of individual service to the Crown was truly 
established as a means for individuals to obtain a habit or commandery of any of the three Military 
Orders. In papal orders issued from 1568 to 1569, there is also evidence of an attempt to make the 
granting of the commanderies of the Orders of Avis and Santiago dependent on the performance of 
service in the war in North Africa, as had been established in connection with the new 
commanderies of the Order of Christ5. Such requirements were established mainly in the 1570s. 
On 18th January 1570, the papal Brief praeclara tua artfully introduced a minimum age 
requirement of 18 years for the granting of a commandery (Corpo Diplomatico…1862-1959:  X, 
360-363). Seven months later, the bull of 18th August (Corpo Diplomatico…1862-1959: XI, 630-
640). revoked the exemptions from combat and associated exemption rights which could be 
invoked, as had often been the case in the past. In order to obtain an ordinary habit of any of the 
Military Orders, it was essential that an individual should have performed three years’ service in 
                                                           
5See the briefs: Circunspecta Romani, of 5th June 1568; Quamvis Majestas, of 28th June 1569 
(Corpo Diplomatico…1862-1959: X, 311-313, 326-327). On this matter, the following briefs are 
also relevant: Praeclara tua, of 18th January 1570; Cogit nos, of 8th July 1570 (Corpo 
Diplomatico…1862-1959: X, ). 
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North Africa. For commanderies, the requirement was greater (seven years) and a royal license was 
required granting authorization for the performance of service, or alternatively an individual could 
serve for a greater length of time (nine years) without previously having obtained authorization. The 
king, as Master of the Orders, now clearly exercised control over which services could be rewarded 
by the granting of such distinctions. An individual could only qualify for a fifth-ranking 
commandery (quinta comenda) without the requirement for having performed service in Africa. 
Besides the above-mentioned bull, various other papal orders issued during the era attempted to 
regulate the length of time of combat service required and establish where service could be rendered. 
In 1572, the Regimento & statutos sobre a reformação das tres orde[n]s militares (Regulations 
and Statutes Regarding the Reform of the Three Military Orders) was printed and approved the 
same year by Gregory XIII at the request of King Sebastian (Corpo Diplomatico…1862-1959: X, 
454-464; ANTT, Gaveta 24, Mç.1, no. 23). The aim was basically to attenuate the excesses of the 
previous bull. In the provisions of the new statutes (this was one of the few occasions on which a 
king was responsible for the issue of new statutes without recourse to the General Chapter), dealing 
with the three Military Orders as one, it was made clear that a habit granted would become the 
personal possession of the grantee (and thus would not involve remuneration or pension rights) 
until such time as he might be granted a commandery. Acceptable spaces for the performance of 
services included not only North Africa but also, for the first time, India (where, however, 
exceptional deeds of service were required) as well as the galleys of the Algarve coast. While the 
number of years’ service required for the granting of a habit was not changed, the same is not true 
with regard to commanderies: for those worth less than 800,000 réis, five years’ service was 
required; above this value, a further year’s service was required. At the same time, only 
commanderies with a net value of up to 100,000 réis could be obtained without a royal letter 
authorizing the performance of service, in contrast to the other aforementioned cases, where this was 
essential.  
A new papal order, issued by Gregory XIII on 25th August 1575, introduced some 
important alterations: the length of service in Africa required for the granting of habits was reduced 
to two years, or three years in the case of India6, for which exceptional deeds continued to be 
required; in order to receive a commandery of any rank or value, one would have to have performed 
3 or 4 years’ service in Africa and to have obtained a royal letter of approval; performance of service 
in the galleys was also acceptable (a year’s service was equivalent to three summers of four months) 
(BN, Cód. 13216: 50-51). 
In another brief issued on 11th June 1577 by Gregory XIII, Exponi nobis (Bullarium 
Patronatus… 1868-1879: I, 246-247), further changes were introduced: services performed in the 
service of the armadas on the high seas involving combat with “Turks, pirates, heretics and the 
                                                           
6This requirement for “services in Africa” to be performed for the reward of an ordinary habit to be 
granted was only abolished by royal order on 11th January 1592 (CARVALHO 1693-1699: I, 
Enucl. III, comp. VI, § 382), which gave Philip II the power to alter the statutes of the Orders 
(GUERRA 1772: I,  293). 
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infidel” were deemed equivalent to those performed in North Africa or in the service of the Algarve 
galleys7. 
During the 1570s, the Crown managed to persuade Rome to demarcate North Africa, 
India, the galleys of the Algarve coast and the armadas of the high seas as spaces for possible combat 
service in connection with the granting of the distinctions of the Military Orders, and relative 
stability in this connection was achieved following the bull of 11th June 1577. Thus the interests of 
the Crown were largely safeguarded in an era during which it was forced to come to terms with the 
pullout from Morocco, increasing competition on the high seas and dependence on the Cape route, 
which was already experiencing a crisis. Besides this, the enemy encountered on the high seas and in 
the other above-mentioned spaces was not generally Roman Catholic, which meant that popes were 
well disposed to considering Portuguese interests. 
Papal orders issued from 1570 onwards provided for a minimum age of 18 for becoming a 
member of any of the three Orders. Aimed at reinforcing the concept of service, this measure caused 
some disquiet and was in clear contrast with the minimum age of 16 for an individual to become a 
confirmed member of any religion, a professed person. Many of those who left for India as soldiers 
were aged only 15 or 168 and the aim was to ensure that those who sought habits could comply 
with the stipulated length of service to the Crown: one obtained reward because one had qualified for 
such through the performance of personal service. In general, this was in stark contrast with 
previous arrangements, based on the principle that a knight should fight for the king because he 
held a habit.  
However, the rules of service were not strictly enforced, even in the time of King Sebastian. 
Meanwhile, the advantage of the system was that service was theoretically required to be performed 
by the individual rather than being based on statutory or other requirements imposed on the 
Military Orders as a unitary body. The performance of personal service now constituted the main 
condition for becoming a member of the Military Orders; it was not, in the final analysis, an 
obligation in the feudal manner. While up until the 1570s, the aim was that knights should serve 
because they held habits, the opposite was now the case: whoever was the beneficiary of services 
which could be rewarded by the Crown had the opportunity to obtain a habit of the Military 
Orders and eventually even obtaining further distinctions if he continued to serve. Whoever 
performed services acquired rights which he could use for his own benefit, even if he were to seek 
reward outside the Masterships. 
Throughout the 16th century in Portugal, the status of service as patrimony, which could 
be dealt with just like any other good, was consolidated: it could be tested, divided up and, if 
necessary, disposed of in any way even if the protagonist was a knight who belonged to a Military 
Order. The Crown had to reward service in order to retain vassals at its bidding who were prepared 
to carry out the various tasks involved in the res publica. As in general it had vast resources at its 
                                                           
7In the definitórios of 1619, first published in 1628, the period of service for the armadas and 
galleys was fixed at 5 years. The duration of each year was equivalent to the period from when a 
vessel left port to when it returned to port  (Definicoens e Estatutos… 1671 [1628]: II Parte - tít. I, 
§ I). 
8In the Committee of the Order of Christ, which finished meeting in 1589, there was a protest 
against such a high age limit; 15 years was indicated as sufficient  (BN, Cód.13216: 25).  
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disposal, and granted them only in life or for life, the returns were guaranteed and the system was 
thus viable. One of the main advantages of the perpetual transfer of the tutelage of the Orders to the 
Crown was to engage them in this system of exchange with the sovereign. Thus, habits and 
commanderies were granted to individuals, along with almost all their revenues. In practice, in 
Portugal, whoever served did so in the expectancy to obtain reward and the king, who was willing to 
grant benefits, aimed to foster the continuation of the performance of services and encourage the 
performance of further services: this was the economy of reward, which was increasingly the basis of 
the relationship between the Crown and its vassals. 
Unlike in Castile, no literature was produced in the 16th and 17th centuries either within 
or outside the Military Orders portraying the service performed by knights as being in the manner 
of a crusade (POSTIGO CASTELLANOS 1995). The obligation to perform combat service derived 
only from the tradition of the Orders. If members did not do so, this would merely lower the 
prestige of the Orders. Individual service to the Crown, however, was accepted as natural. It meant 
that a habit was merited, even if the space in which service had been performed was not mentioned 
in the bulls promulgated by Pius V and Gregory XIII. In fact, these orders were never completely 
put into practice; following the events of 1580-1581, they were quickly forgotten. Philip II of Spain 
made great use of the three Orders as a means of attracting individuals to his camp, and many of the 
services he rewarded were merely equivalent to the purchasing of political support. A good example 
of this was the awards made to the procurators of the Cortes of Tomar of 1581, many of whom 
received habits of the Military Orders (OLIVAL 1988: I, 71-75). 
If military service becoming the norm was more generally acceptable, the process of 
establishing the system generated some opposition. At the General Chapter of 1573, a request was 
made to the Master to slow down the rate at which changes were being made. The fact that 
commanderies could only be granted on the basis of combat service against the infidel, except for 
fifth-ranking rewards (quinta comenda), was regarded negatively. According to a later account, “this 
would result in great harm being done to the King’s exchequer, by virtue of his obligation to pay 
candidates for services rendered, and to his authority and jurisdiction, which should be taken into 
account when granting a favor with regard to the said commanderies, with the liberty previously 
enjoyed by his ancestors” (BN, Cód. 13216: 52-52v). Thus it was stressed that the sovereign’s 
power would be reduced in two ways: firstly, by allowing the obligation to pay for these services to 
become the norm; and secondly, by losing the faculty thus far enjoyed to grant commanderies as 
and when he wished. 
In December 1589, an Order of Christ reform committee (junta) completed its work 
(OLIVAL 2004: 97-104). The reforms not only reflected the above-mentioned step taken by the 
General Chapter of 1573, but also made reference to the fact that Gregory XIII had invested the 
Master with the power to alter the statutes and encouraged Philip II to do this. In order to stress the 
dependence and inoperability of the normative texts of Pius V and Gregory XIII that were cited, the 
committee advised that a request should be made, “in order to safeguard his conscience, and likewise 
that of those to whom he granted the said rewards,” to the Pope for “exemption for rewards, which 
he has done for habits and commanderies for many in these Kingdoms, and abroad, who do not 
present the qualifications or have not performed services that the holy apostolic statutes require”; this 
he should do for those which had been awarded from 23rd December 1581, because permission 
had been granted for those granted up until that time (BN, Cód. 13216: 53v). Thus, the power of 
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the king was greatly dependent on Rome. An appeal was made for the reform of the arrangements 
established by popes in the early 1570s “because it is not against the institution of this Order, and 
its aims, to receive people into the Order if they are granted only a habit, without having performed 
services, although after becoming a member of the Order they are obliged to comply with service 
requirements, when His Majesty and his successors might order them to do this. And thus it seems, 
that, from now on, His Majesty and his successors may freely award the ordinary habit of this 
Order of Christ to whoever they please, for any services, of any rank, and for whatever length of 
time, even if these are not granted in return for combat service against the infidel, providing they are 
people from whom the order receives honor and advantage” (BN, Cód. 13216: 53v-54). With 
regard to habits, this request summed up the situation which applied at the end of the 16th century. 
In fact, few of the provisions established from 1570 to 1575 were complied with. The Alcácer-
Quibir defeat and the dispute regarding the throne threw the question of normative precepts into 
confusion. These circumstances also affected commanderies, many of which fell vacant in 1578 and 
ended up being given to sons who were minors (BN, Cód. 498: 1v), or even as a means of helping 
relatives in financial difficulties, or as a solution in other similar situations, for example, obtaining 
the release of relatives who had been captured in North Africa. 
In social terms, the obligation to fight the infidel was a costly enterprise that few were 
prepared to undertake. In 1570 and 1580, the tension could be felt between, on the one hand, the 
statutory requirements acquired by king-masters, harking back to the bull which established the 
Order of Christ and provided for the transfer of the tutelage of the three Orders to the Crown and 
the combat tradition of the Orders, and, on the other hand, the social interest in obtaining these 
distinctions with ease. Following the events of 1580, the latter set of circumstances prevailed. In 
1582, 205 new insignia of the Order of Christ alone were awarded, an extremely large number 
(OLIVAL 1988: I, 71), in fact the largest number in the history of the Order until the reforms 
made by Queen Mary I in 1789. In 1592, following the papal brief of 1591 which endowed 
Philip II with the power to alter the statutes of the Orders, a royal license issued on 11th January 
1592 (CARVALHO 1693-1699: I, Enucl. III, comp. VI, § 382) abolished the obligation 
regarding the performance of “services in Africa”9 for the granting of habits. Henceforth, in practice, 
the principle was established that a habit could be awarded for any kind of service, whether personal 
or not (habits could also be granted to those who held the respective rights).  
The requirement for “services in Africa” to be performed for the granting of a commandery 
was retained until 1834; though by the end of the 16th century it was not enforced in the majority 
of cases. The normal procedure was that a request would be made to Rome for dispensation, even in 
the case of a new commandery. In fact, from this time on, commanderies were awarded in exchange 
for the performance of all kinds of services, or occasionally even without such a requirement. 
At the above-mentioned committee of 1589, a proposal was also put forward for the 
awarding of new or old commanderies to those who had served with royal authorization; this was 
aimed at avoiding applications for commanderies in exchange for services of any kind, and it was 
argued that for deserving cases there were other rewards (BN, Cód. 13216: 57-59V). None of this 
had any effect. At the end of the 16th century, the idea prevailed that the Orders constituted above 
                                                           
9A synecdoche which covered services in North Africa, India and the armadas as a whole or any one 
of these stages.  
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all a source of reward for good servants of the Crown, whether they were political supporters, 
efficient administrators or soldiers providing military service either at home or in the Empire. Those 
who held rights over services rendered increasingly felt that theoretically they enjoyed rights to 
privileges which could be sought from the king. Thus, service represented a source of power rather 
than a form of obligation. This certainly facilitated the spread of a pattern of behavior that ultimately 
benefited the Crown, which was thus able to increase the number of good servants.  
 
3. Fro m the re lat ive opening  up of access to the Or ders to the statutes defin ing  
pur it y  of  b lood  and  occupation 
 
In the time of Dom Jorge de Lencastre, a candidate was subject to certain tests in order to 
become a member of the Military Orders of Avis and Santiago. While this is clearly documented 
from 1523 onwards, it would also have been common practice before that. Above all, candidates’ 
means were tested in terms of patrimony or income (just as in the case of qualifications de genere, 
which applied to the secular clergy), as well as their capacity to serve, and proof was required that 
they were not involved in any judicial proceedings (PIMENTA 2002: 230-231). An inquiry was 
held and witnesses called by the candidate.  
The statutes of the Order of Santiago of 1542 introduced stricter rules. For the first time, 
people were excluded if they themselves, their parents, and their four grandparents were practicing 
Jews or Moslems, although converts were not covered by the exclusion: “but if by the grace of God 
any enlightened soul should convert to our holy faith, and if that person should be served or 
honored by the Order, in such a case the Master may receive him” (Regra et statutos… 1542: chap. 
IV). Also excluded from the Order were ‘mechanics’ (manual workers) and laborers, and the means 
for qualification was set at 400,000 reals in kind or 20,000 reals in income (Regra et statutos… 
1542: chap. IV). There is evidence that the same rules were applied to the Order of Avis during the 
rest of the 1540s (See for example ANTT, Habilitações da Ordem de Avis, Letter A, Mç.3, no. 20). 
Such rules, however, were not rigorously applied. Only when the bull, Ad Regie Maiestatis, 
was promulgated by Pius V on 18th August 1570 were statutes truly regulating purity of blood and 
occupation introduced for the Portuguese Military Orders. These were some of the first institutions 
in Portugal to adopt statutes of purity of blood, although such rules had long been in force in 
Castile. Against a background of efforts by kings to encourage their servants to fight, it was no 
surprise that three aspects which decisively contributed towards shaping the Orders in the period of 
the Ancien Régime came to the fore at this time: services, purity of blood and noble credentials. 
Regarding the last of these, it should be noted that noble blood (fidalguia) was not required 
of those who applied for a habit; all that was required was ‘purity of occupation’ since the generation 
of the candidate’s grandparents. This was very different from belonging to noble lineage. The 
situation was different for the Castilian Orders: status of blood nobility was required. Purity of 
occupation was much easier to prove. 
However, in the last three decades of the 16th century, candidates for habits were not 
subjected to rigorous examination. It is highly probable that the consequences of Alcácer-Quibir and 
the accession to the throne of the Castilian Habsburgs were largely the cause of this.  
In 1589, when the Reform Committee of the Order of Christ finished its work, the 
deliberations recorded regarding the provisions to be complied with by new applicants were still 
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very flexible. Here is an extract: “those of the Moorish race or of the Jewish race, or the sons or 
grandsons of mechanics, and in all these cases even if someone proves that he has noble blood or 
noble ancestors, or be a knight, or an esquire known as a good man, and who has more qualities 
which the statutes of the Order require, they are not received into the Order. However, if the son of 
a mechanic who has performed significant service, and the bastard son of a noble, even if he has 
performed no service, if they are written in His Majesty’s Books as nobles, in such cases they may be 
awarded a habit without dispensation; this may also be done in the case of the grandson of a 
mechanic who has performed significant service, and His Majesty or his successors may regard him 
as being extremely worthy of a habit, even though he does not appear as a noble in his books.” (BN, 
Cód. 13216: 23). Thus a series of exceptions could be made regarding social status. Firstly, 
mechanic parentage was exempted by virtue of noble privilege (foro da Casa Real) obtained by 
services: such a candidate enjoyed the same status as that of a bastard of a noble attached to the Royal 
Household; having mechanic grandparents posed fewer difficulties: as long as one had rendered 
considerable service, noble privilege was not required in order to qualify for the award of a habit. It 
should be noted that these exceptions were much more important when they were made in 
connection with the award of habits without dispensation. In practice, they were regarded as being of 
noble status just like the others.  
The committee of 1589 went further: it allowed the “residents of the Places of Africa” 
(Ceuta, Tangier and Mazagão) who had accumulated service rights to be awarded the habit of the 
Order of Christ, the most sought-after in Portugal, even though they were the descendents of Moors 
or even Moors themselves, provided that they had converted to Roman Catholicism. Similarly, 
mechanic ancestry was exempted from the rules, even in the case of the sons of mechanics. However, 
such individuals attached to North Africa were required to apply for a dispensation containing 
details of their occupation and blood status: “And the residents of the places of Africa, who live 
there, and have their houses and wives there, and who are granted by the King, Dom Manuel, thirty 
habits and commanderies worth ten thousand réis each, even though they are of the Moorish race, or 
any of them has been a Moor, and who has been newly converted and has become a Christian, if by 
their services in the said parts they show that they are worthy of the habit and commanderies 
intended for them, then they should be granted a habit by means of dispensation. This should 
make mention of their defect and the reason why dispensation is being made. This should be done 
even if they are the sons of mechanics.” (BN, Cód. 13216: 23-23v). Not even the commanderies of 
North Africa were denied them.  
Thus those who sat on the committee, dominated by people close to interests at the political 
center, clearly identified with the tendency to associate habits with service. In North Africa, not even 
Moorish blood in the case of the candidate himself need pose an obstacle. Only the Jews were totally 
excluded. Apparently, low status could be comparatively easily exempted if important service had 
been performed in parts of the Empire to which it was difficult to attract servants, like North Africa. 
Only in 1592, did Philip II reserve for Rome the dispensation for the defects of Jewish and 
Moorish blood (CARVALHO 1693-1699: I, Enucl. III, comp. VI, § 382). Before this, despite the 
bull of Pius V of 1570, sovereigns had continued to exempt defects. For this purpose, they used a 
clause “of my certain science and absolute power”, which was included in the provisions of the 
awarding of habits. 
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In 1592, only this kind of situation was covered by the jurisdiction of the Holy See. In 
matters of pagans or heathens (natives of Africa, America and Asia), kings continued to grant 
dispensation, although sometimes reluctantly. This is an important point, with regard to a 
monarchy with a huge colonial empire, whose defense was always difficult and sometimes involved 
the important contribution of native human resources, as in the case of the expulsion of the Dutch 
from Brazil in the 17th century10. 
The rules governing access to the distinctions of the Orders were applied more strictly when 
in 1597 the requirement was introduced for inquiry to be undertaken in the place of birth of a 
candidate, his parents and grandparents11; a knight of the respective habit was specially sent out to 
serve on the inquiry and had to produce a report on the candidate; a legal official, the corregedor da 
comarca, was responsible for conducting the inquiry; if he or his wife did not qualify because of 
purity of blood impediments, the onus was on the head of the provedor or on the head of the juiz de 
fora12. 
The effort made during the last thirty years of the 16th century to produce statutes 
governing purity of blood and occupation led to an increase in the value of habits and raised 
standards as far as the strict application of the background investigations was concerned. All this 
changed the social status of habits. Here is a clear example: Cristóvão Esteves, one of the compilers of 
the latest version of the Ordenações Manuelinas, who was of Jewish ancestry, had been a Knight of 
the Order of Christ since 1515, but rarely used the title. In many letters issued by the Royal 
Chancellery dating from the late 1540s, he is referred to merely as Doctor Cristóvão Esteves da 
Espargosa, “fidalgo of the Royal Household and chaplain to the Royal Household, from the Council 
of State and Desembargador do Paço” (ANTT, Perdões e Legitimações de D. João III, Lº 1: 13v-14, 
20, 20v, passim; Lº IV: 24, 25v, 94v, 95, passim). A century later, in the same circumstances, 
reference to a habit of the Order of Christ would never have been omitted. In the intervening 
period, the distinction had taken on a new significance and a new symbolic meaning. 
Such a transformation was largely due to the Crown’s intervention in the affairs of the 
Orders with a view to bringing them under its control. It if had not done this, how could it have 
rewarded services rendered and drawn advantage from such circumstances? The Crown transformed 
the habit into a distinct means of rewarding service and granting privilege to its servants. Receiving a 
                                                           
10This does not mean that many blacks were awarded habits (DUTRA 1977-1979: 25-35; 
DUTRA 1999: 91-113). 
11Inquiries were even held in Lisbon, at the house of the General Judge (Juiz Geral) of the Military 
Orders, who called 2 to 4 witnesses - see ANTT, Mesa da Consciência - Ordens Militares - Papéis 
Diversos, Mç. 22, doc. 126. 
12ANTT, Mesa da Consciência, Lº 310: 62-64. Only after the definitórios left the General Chapter of 
1619 were commissars created, which reflected the practice that was current in Castile. 
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habit was not the same as acquiring pension rights. Likewise, for the Crown, rewarding services 
rendered with a pension or with a habit was not the same thing. From a strictly financial standpoint 
it would have been cheaper to take the latter course, even though a habit was rarely granted without a 
pension. The so-called ‘habit pension’ did not involve a large amount of money: 20,000 réis in the 
last quarter of the 16th century and 12,000 réis from the 1660s onwards. 
In short, by the end of the 16th century, membership in one of the Military Orders was a 
very different prospect from similar circumstances at the beginning of the century. In connection 
with the past, they only tended to exploit the traditional ideals bound up with performing military 
service. By the end of the century, the Military Orders remained a feature of society, but were 
endowed with a completely new social and political connotation. They became essential instruments 
used by the Crown for ensuring the maintenance of discipline and for awarding social distinction. 
For all these reasons, the perpetual transfer of tutelage of the Masterships to the Crown 
represented a crucial step towards consolidating the economy of reward. It was also a significant 
feature of the process of the construction of the Early Modern State. In order for this to be accepted 
without serious conflict between the Crown and elite groups, they had to be rewarded with 
distinctions they regarded as relevant, such as habits and commanderies. 
These dynamic processes were closely linked. In the 16th century, the Crown managed to 
bring the Masterships under its perpetual control, gradually ensure that individual service 
constituted the means of access to these institutions and also increase the value of habits, endowing 
them with the status of purity of blood and occupation. However, in practice, the Crown admitted 
many exceptions to the established rules, showing a degree of flexibility which acted in its interest. 
Without pitting the Crown against its subjects, how was all this managed? The introduction of 
services, although it had its supporters, did encounter some resistance, which has not been dealt 
with in this paper. It was no accident that the new system was only gradually put in place. No great 
obstacles were placed in the way of the other two great changes, especially the introduction of the 
statutes. This appears to be explained by the fact that, firstly, during the era, Portuguese noble 
houses were not very wealthy or powerful and, secondly, the fact that, on various occasions, the 
Cortes called for the introduction of service as a means of achieving noble distinctions, following the 
example of the Order of Malta. The Crown appears to have enjoyed a strong bargaining position 
both in relation to Rome and on the domestic front; such power produced a capacity on the part of 
the Crown to often make exceptions (which took on the status of privileges) without undermining 
the overall system.  
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